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Executive Summary  
The food industry faces unprecedented challenges to the integrity and safety of its 
food supply chain as that chain has become simultaneously more complex and 
global in nature. 
The principal objective of this project was to enhance and develop a working version 
of a pre-existing model “NSF Fraud Protection Model” which has been developed to 
help reputable large scale food retailers and regulators anticipate the relative 
likelihood of fraudulent attack on the many and varied product lines offered to 
consumers. 
With the aim of feeding into the development of the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” 
model, two major tasks were undertaken.  The first was a detailed identification and 
review of other available tools and models being used for food fraud detection and 
prevention.  The second was a survey and set of interviews of industry 
representatives to test the key assumptions underpinning the “NSF Fraud Protection 
Model”, with subsequent validation by industry and regulators. 
The outcome of this project is a working prototype of the “NSF fraud protection 
model” model that has been developed through interactive sessions between project 
team members and tested by presentation for feedback from industry and regulatory 
representatives. 
An overview of the development of the “NSF Fraud Protection Model”. 
The model being enhanced is conceptual. It arose from a request for help to assess 
and manage the scale of food fraud being encountered in 2013 by a global 
supermarket retailer to one of the project team, David Edwards, the then head of 
consulting at NSF International, a US based, not for profit, public health and safety 
organisation. 
A key aspect of the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” model is that it approaches the 
issue of fraud from the perspective of what is advantageous to the fraudster. In other 
words, to help organisations ‘think like a criminal’. The assumption being that 
fraudsters involved in organised deception are more likely to target high value, easy 
to implement and difficult to detect adulterations/substitutions, in essence to target 
situations where they perceive the greatest return financially for the least effort and 
lowest likelihood of detection. (Opportunistic fraudsters could be predicted to not to 
conform to this model.) 
Three main factors were considered in the original model: 
 The potential profit a fraudster can make  
 The potential difficulty/cost for the fraudster of making a viable substitution 
(opportunistically and technically)  
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 The likelihood of detection by a reputable food business customer or 
regulators  
This project examined whether these initially proposed factors were appropriate.  The 
aim was to create simple indicative criteria of scale (measurement indices) or 
modifications to the conceptual model such that food groups/categories can be 
mapped onto a 4 quadrant Boston Consulting Group (BCG) matrix style framework. 
The intention is that the framework will provide a clear visual representation of 
relative product risk. Thus enabling easier and more consistent and prioritised 
targeting of surveillance measures, supply network controls and preventative 
interventions.  
The project team designed a BCG style matrix which places product groups in 
quadrants - as illustrated below -with the top right quadrant containing products that 
are most attractive to a fraudster and bottom left being the least attractive. Size of the 
circle represents perceived difficulty to the perpetrator of undertaking the particular 
fraud, (for simplicity ranked as small, medium, large). 
 
 
 
 
Illustrative only 
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In addition to prioritisation, the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” model also aims to 
provide a pro-active approach to anticipating the potential for fraud since it helps 
identify relative vulnerability.   
Summary of model development work 
The desk top review and interviews undertaken as part of the project research base 
suggested that the methods currently used by food companies and regulators to 
anticipate fraudulent activity can best be described as a combination of the 
experience embedded within the tacit knowledge base of their buying or technical 
teams together with evidence, where available, of past incidents and fraudulent 
activity within a particular sector or food category. Essentially the current anticipation 
of fraud is based on historical events and sector experience. 
The industry survey suggested that there are considerable gaps in technical 
knowledge within industry as to which types of product are most vulnerable. It also 
confirmed that there are no identifiable predictive tools currently available, nor 
recognised training in the industry on how to anticipate fraud. 
The final framework was reviewed and validated in several ways. Firstly through 
exposure to an end user groups comprising representatives of Industry, the FSA, and 
Defra and secondly by assessing questionnaire responses which amongst other 
things compared informed industry opinion “gut feel” in terms of different products 
relative vulnerability to the models predictions.  
Use of the model 
The final model delivers a working framework by which the technical and/or food 
safety teams in food businesses or in regulatory bodies can begin to better anticipate 
which product lines are most/least likely to be targeted by fraudsters and why, 
whether or not they have been attacked previously.  
Once food products or broad food categories have been assessed in terms of their 
attractiveness to a “predator” fraudster i.e. one who is focussed on a deliberate 
systematic crime then interventions can be designed to thwart such activities by the 
application of interventions which move vulnerable products from the top right to 
bottom left of the BCG style matrix. These interventions might include 
 Increasing detection likelihood by increasing the frequency of or forensic 
quality of auditing.  
 Changing the nature of routine third party auditing to focus more effectively on 
fraud or introducing new Fraud Specific Audits. 
 Enhanced frequency or sophistication of sampling and testing regimes  
 Making the insertion of fraudulent replacement into the supply chain more 
difficult by enhanced security measures. 
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Limitations of the model 
The developed model is probably less useful where the fraudulent substitution takes 
place for reasons other than systemic organised crime for example to meet 
unforeseen shortfall of supply when demand peaks or there is some form of short 
term supply failure.  
Further sophistication of the model was considered by the project team to take 
account of this kind of opportunistic fraud but it was felt at this stage of development 
that approach added undue complexity to what is intended as a working tool. 
The sample size was too small to allow statistically valid correlation of “gut feel” 
verses model prediction but the project team were encouraged that model predictions 
were in line with expectations. More work is required on validation of this kind and we 
suggest additional assessment using the model of past incidents would be helpful in 
this respect. 
The “NSF Fraud Protection Model” was considered indicative of best practise by 
industry representatives. It was agreed adoption of the model would facilitate a more 
systematic and consistent approach particularly amongst SMEs who may not have 
access to larger technical teams of experts. 
Potential for further development of a dynamic model  
The scope of this project was to produce a static model.  However, this model is 
ready to be developed into a dynamic and real time approach. For example, supply 
and demand fluctuations which significantly impact on potential profit and therefore 
fraudulent incentives, can be incorporated into a more fluid version of the model. 
A concern was expressed that the model would need to be dynamic adapting to 
changing market conditions and should be able to be customised to particular 
companies circumstances. The project team see no particular difficulty with either 
need. The evaluation criteria for example indicative profit could be routinely updated 
ideally in real time using online sources and customisation is obviously possible for 
the three key assessment criteria relating to either the complexity or detail of 
detection methods to represent those actually in use in a particular company. 
Background 
The rising trend in globalised food trade is creating complexity in the supply network 
and a greater opportunity for food fraud. As a consequence, the global food industry 
is suffering sophisticated and increasing pressures from food fraudsters.  
It was reported in Food Manufacture in 2011 - that organised crime is switching to 
food fraud from activities such as drug trafficking, because detection methods are 
less developed and penalties are softer. The Horse meat crisis in early 2013 provides 
recent hard proof of such a connection. 
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(http://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Ingredients/Criminals-drop-drugs-for-food-fraud). 
Intelligence gathering to fight food fraud is being addressed internationally through a 
number of Government led initiatives but industry intelligence goes currently largely 
untapped. Furthermore supermarket retailers and large food companies/ 
manufacturers are themselves finding the scale of food fraud detection and the range 
of products potentially affected potentially overwhelming.  
Arising from a private conversation with the technical director of a global scale 
supermarket retailer concerning the nature and scale of fraudulent practice being 
experienced in China David Edwards then Consulting Director at NSF International 
was asked to suggest a mechanism to risk assess broad areas of vulnerability to 
fraud in a typical supermarkets food supply network.  
Whilst information on existing fraud was available and increasingly well documented 
and collated, no food specific predictive tools could be identified that are designed to 
help anticipate or risk assess products and product categories in terms of their 
vulnerability to fraudulent attack. 
Drawing on previous experience of risk modelling in both health and safety and food 
a simple Boston Matrix style the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” was suggested as a 
viable approach to risk assessment. Developing this matrix into a framework focused 
on  the key motivations for fraud where criteria indicative of likelihood provided a 
scale upon which to map in two dimensions formed the core of the project, 
Project Objectives 
This work was commissioned by the Food Standards Agency (FSA) in 2013 to: 
1) Review what is known regarding current fraud incidents.  
2) Identify any other fraud risk assessment tools. 
3) Develop and enhance the initially proposed “NSF Fraud Protection Model” 
framework by incorporating information gained in objectives 1 and 2 above. 
4) Propose means by which the initial framework can be used and or enhanced 
and integrated with other fraud management tools. 
Approach to the work 
The project aimed to create deliberately simple criteria indicative of likelihood of fraud 
(measurement indices) for either the three originally proposed or subsequently 
modified factors such that food groups/categories could subsequently be mapped on 
the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) Style framework to highlight  vulnerabilities 
enabling better targeting of surveillance measures, supply network controls and 
preventative interventions.  
A key aspect was to develop the model in an iterative series of events in order to add 
enhancements that were driven by informed stakeholders from industry, the FSA and 
other regulatory bodies. Thus, the first exploration of the focus and boundaries of the 
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model involved participation in a project team conference where considerable 
building and stress testing cycles were applied to each key component of the model.  
Subsequent further refinement, via teleconferencing and substantive literature and 
database research, was followed by a stakeholder conference where both general 
and detailed feedback from stakeholders (industry, regulatory bodies and the FSA) 
was incorporated. In parallel, an internet-based questionnaire was posited with the 
survey result analyses informing development. Further refinement was adopted from 
key points arising from the stakeholder engagement. 
The project team also suggested ways in which the framework can be used in a 
practical sense and enhanced by its development from a static model to a dynamic 
model wherever possible updated in real time as new information becomes available 
or measurement indices change for example price data. 
The work was undertaken in four principal phases:  
Phase 1: Review Current Incidents and Fraud Assessment Tools 
Phase 2: Stake Holder Interviews.  
Phase 3: Initial Assessment 
Phase 4 Organisational Validation 
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Phase 1: Review Current Incidents and Fraud Assessment Tools 
Literature Study 
A literature and internet search of available risk assessment tools, risk management 
solutions, available data and reports on known fraudulent incidents across the risk 
spectrum was carried out Appendix 1 – Framework Elaboration. 
The outcome was 337 publications were scrutinised at the title, abstract or full 
document level (as appropriate) to identify if they met the remit of the review.  
This established existing published work and media reports that were relevant to the 
task of creating and enhancing the proposed framework. 
Details of other tools or frameworks for understanding fraud mechanisms and the 
motivations of fraudsters are also contained in Appendix 1 and were referenced 
where appropriate and to inform the development of the proposed framework. 
Following the literature and internet scoping exercise, initial results were harmonised 
and scrutinised in order to identify appropriate search terms and approaches for the 
systematic review. This led to a dual approach of a systematic literature review in 
parallel with a search of the internet - including official regulatory sources. A literature 
search was conducted (in late September 2013) using the selected databases 
(ScienceDirect and Scopus) using the terms and parameters including 
Adulterant(s/ation), Authenticity, Corruption, Counterfeit, Anti-Fraud, Fraud, Food 
fraud, Forensic, Fraud Management, Incidents, Tools, Solutions, Procurement, 
Reporting over 30 months.  
The outcomes were: a full review of key information from the literature, internet 
sources and professional network/regulators sources to inform the direction of the 
project in terms of ‘state of the art’, requirement for a new model and essential key 
components. The information was shared with the project team in advance of 
meetings to define a “working model”. 
Scrutiny of these sources item the literature study led to selection of 17 separate 
items relating to the focus of this project and creation of indicative or predictive 
criteria (measurement indices). These are summarised in tabular form and are 
discussed more fully in Appendix 1 – Framework Elaboration. 
Findings of literature study relevant to the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” 
development 
Key findings from these that were considered particularly relevant to the “NSF Fraud 
Protection Model” models subsequent development were as follows: 
  
 10 
Food Fraud definition 
Several definitions exist but an appropriate definition of food fraud for the purpose of 
the model was taken as a collective term that encompasses the deliberate 
substitution, addition, tampering, or misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, or 
food packaging, or false or misleading statements made about a product for 
economic gain (Spink, 2011).  
Other fraud modelling and frameworks 
The “Food Fraud Triangle” as defined by Grocery Manufacturers Association & A.T. 
Kearney (2010) considered key indicators as profit, avoidance of detection and 
opportunity. The proposed “NSF Fraud Protection Model” model already takes 
account of profit and detection. Opportunity was considered as a further 
enhancement of the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” but rejected at this stage to avoid 
additional complexity. Fraudulent substitution merely to meet short term customer 
supply chain demands rather than profit was also excluded from the model at this 
stage. 
Morehouse (2010) states that the first step against fraud is to create a perpetual 
repository of information that consolidates all relevant historical information to include 
ingredient, adulterant, source, date of incidence, cost to the firm and actions taken. 
Lipp (2012) identifies potential profit as the key criterion with supply and demand as 
a useful indicator, physical state (Liquids, powders & pastes being most at risk) and 
feasibility (Difficulty):‘If it [the fraud] requires really specialist knowledge or specialist 
equipment then it may not happen.  
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Databases of previous incidents and rapid alert systems 
Two key fraud databases the NCFPD (National Centre for Food Protection) and USP   
(US Pharmacopeial) were identified that outlined the frequency and scale of past 
incidents and these were used to determine some products that should be “tested” 
against the model and to guide the team in terms of examining varying profit potential 
between different food products.  
Further modeling work is recommended in this area to “fine tune” the accuracy of the 
“NSF Fraud Protection Model” framework in terms of its predictive capabilities. Ideally 
had time allowed the project team would test all products listed in the two databases 
(NCFPD, USP). 
 
Information from known incidents 
The evaluation of known incidents gave rise to 10 separate components which 
appeared to researchers to be important factors contributing to fraud. These 
significantly assisted the project team to build the scoring mechanisms for profit, 
likelihood of detection and ease of substitution.  Appendix 1 – Framework Elaboration 
Known incidents suggested the following factors were important: 
  Knowingly buying below market price 
 Presence of added value claims (organic, Healthy, free range)  
 High profit margins 
 Less likely to be detected 
 Less detectable due to low concentration 
 Evadable testing 
 Demand exceeding supply 
 Passed through many hands 
 Cost of adulterant 
 Physical form(powdered)eased adulteration process  
 12 
Similar fraud indicators were also described at the Leatherhead/FERA launch of the 
Horizon scan Tool (April 2013) which were also incorporated into the “NSF Fraud 
Protection Model” development process as appropriate. These were: 
 Raw material quality, cost, and availability 
 Adulterant material cost and availability 
 Profit associated with delivery of goods 
 Loss and consequences associated with a failure to deliver goods. 
 Perception of associated risk and consequences 
 Likelihood of being caught 
 Consequences of being caught 
 Ease of adulteration particularly in comminuted, liquid, powder and processed 
ingredients of products 
 Scale, profit and consequences 
 Supply chain demands 
 Legislative changes 
 Links between productivity & reward 
 Ability to hide deception 
 Corporate awareness 
 Sampling and testing 
 
Factors contributing to Food Fraud. Source: Leatherhead/FERA launch 2013 
Research into organised crime 
Examination of research in the area of organised crime and the supply chain 
suggested that non-traditional sources of data could be used for fraud detection e.g. 
for example tax records and this could impact likelihood of detection if successful.  
However, the team felt these detection methods were under developed at the current 
time and therefore did not include them as a factor.  
Long or complex supply chains presented many challenges to detection. This fact 
was incorporated into the detection assessment. 
Existing detection tools 
Existing online fraud detection tools and data exchanges like the RASFF EU rapid 
alert system, Horizon scan (an alliance between FERA Food and Environment 
Research Agency and Leatherhead Food Research), Foodquest a commercial 
product were all considered in terms of their potential impact on detection.  
The conclusion of the team was that this aspect of the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” 
(likelihood of detection) would need to remain under regular review to take account of 
any game changing detection methods which might significantly impact on fraudulent 
behaviours. It is not clear at this time how effective the horizon scanning tools will be. 
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Industry Standards 
Industry standards and inspection standards were clearly one means by which the 
potential for fraud could be limited. The GFSI (Global Food Safety Initiative) now 
recognises food fraud as a food safety issue and is currently focussing on embedding 
fraud controls into standards, advised by a food fraud think- tank (Spink 2013a). 
Compliance to the BRC Food Safety Standard is considered by many an industry 
‘ticket to trade’ within the UK and or provides a degree of legal Due Diligence for 
retailers. It has provided significant improvement in traditional food safety & quality 
standards but does not currently provide any requirements for fraud management & 
control, although this is currently under review 
 
Testing 
Examination of this aspect of fraud control highlighted that organised Fraudsters are 
well aware of testing regimes. In summary testing methodologies are clearly 
continually being improved and enhanced and any fraud anticipation model will have 
to be dynamic enough to take account of these technological changes since 
significant improvements to testing efficacy may force fraudsters to alter the products 
they target.  There is in effect a testing and detection avoidance “arms race” that 
must be continually monitored. Appendix 1 – Framework Elaboration discusses some 
of the latest analytical techniques.  
When dealing with specific foods the model indices for likelihood of detection could 
be adapted and calibrated to take account of very specific tests and their known 
frequency of application.  However, the project team took an approach that 
Individuals using the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” model would be cognisant of 
what testing was available and in use and therefore for the benefit of simplicity it was 
sufficient at this stage of the model’s development to use a high medium low type of 
approach to testing efficacy.  
Fraud risk management, Governance and best practice 
A global survey on fraud risk management assessing the status of implementation of 
current best practice across a variety of business sectors was carried out between 
November 2011 & February 2012 (Ernst & Young, 2012.) 
 This was based on 1,700 interviews in 43 countries with chief financial officers 
and heads of legal, compliance and internal audit, to get their views of fraud, 
bribery & corruption risk and how their businesses are mitigating them. 
 Forensic data analysis and other technology-related tools were seldom 
adopted and robust risk-based compliance audits, including transaction testing 
not common practice.  
 Governance and Risk Compliance (GRC) flips the focus of food fraud from 
detection by scientific means to Board room Governance to identify 
vulnerabilities as compared to recurring events. 
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 Spink (2013b) advocates the adoption of Corporate Governance as a 
mechanism to prepare for a Black Swan event. [Black Swan events are the 
unknown unknowns and led to the evolution of Enterprise Risk Management 
ERM.  Spink & Moyer (2011a) 
 Spink & Moyer (2011a) also relate the classic fraud triangle model to food 
fraud showing that improved internal control systems are critical to reducing 
'Opportunity' factors in a business.  
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Phase 2: Stake Holder Interviews and Survey 
Interviews 
The purpose of the interviews was: 
 To further understand what is currently known about the nature and 
extent of food fraud.  
 To identify any information or fraud control methodologies that may not 
be currently known to the FSA or covered in available literature.  
 To help establish what methodologies are currently used by large 
manufacturers and retailers to manage food fraud. 
 To better understand the financial mechanisms and other commercial 
drivers that impact purchasing decisions and thereby how fraudsters 
might seek to exploit these. 
An interview with John Questier and Jane Ince of the FSA was carried out to provide 
an understanding of the Food Standards Agency systems in place, their scope and 
reach and to identify potential shortfalls. The basis of the interview was to further 
explore the weaknesses identified in the findings of the National Audit Office Report 
on Meat Supply Chain Integrity (NAO, 2013). Associated interview questions relating 
to industry weaknesses were agreed with the FSA and developed into a semi-
structured interview format.  
Individual & collective stakeholder interviews were carried out using the semi–
structured interview format to access relevant organisational literature, industry 
expertise and identify domain experts. Interviews were held with Retailers, 
Manufacturers and representatives from Local authorities.  
The purpose of the survey and interviews was: 
To further understand what is currently known about the nature and extent of 
food fraud.  
To identify any information or fraud control methodologies that may not be 
currently known to the FSA or covered in available literature.  
To help establish what methodologies are currently used by large 
manufacturers and retailers to manage food fraud. 
To better understand the financial mechanisms and other commercial drivers 
that impact purchasing decisions and thereby how fraudsters might seek to 
exploit these. 
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Interview results 
Food Standards Agency 
An interview with John Questier and Jane Ince of the FSA was carried out, using the 
framework of the findings from the National Audit Office Report on Meat Supply 
Chain Integrity (NAO, 2013). 
Figure 1: FSA Intelligence Network 
 
 
The best picture provided as to how FSA intelligence currently operates was a more 
detailed schematic diagram shown in Figure 2 of the inter-relationships of the various 
organisations in the intelligence network with no visibility of data sources or links.  
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of FSA Intelligence Interactions  
 
The current quality & quantity of intelligence was questionable and the inadequate 
input from industry was highlighted. The limitations and reluctance to input on a blank 
page format for industry to provide intelligence was discussed; a template 
mechanism to facilitate industry input is in development by EU DGSANCO (New 
Food Fraud Department). There appears to be a strong perception by the FSA that 
industry has intelligence that they are not prepared to share.  
The three notifications in the RASFF database on horse meat fraud in February and 
March 2012 were discussed. The response provided after the meeting was that they 
appeared to refer to horse carcasses/meat and as such appear to relate to the 
‘legitimate’ trade in European horsemeat for consumption as such, (rather than 
dubious meat products). There is no information on the nature of the potential fraud, 
but there’s no indication of meat species substitution. Also, the notifications are for 
UK general information only, as the UK were not a recipient of the meat and there is 
no requirement to take any action.  
The FSA representative was not involved at the time of the notifications but was of 
the view that there is nothing to raise suspicions of the horsemeat species 
substitution affair – the legal trade in horsemeat has been subject to alerts for 
different reasons over the years as with most products. 
The interview questions for industry were agreed with the FSA. 
 18 
Industry Interviews  
The list of questions and summary of responses are summarised in Appendix 2 – 
Industry Interview Responses and described below: 
 There is a strong reliance on specifications and supplier assurance. The 
majority of businesses have introduced robust surveillance on meat since 
the Horse Meat Crisis. 
 Confidentiality was identified as the key hurdle to overcome if businesses 
are to readily to share information. 
 Authenticity testing protocols are predominantly advised by external 
laboratories. No independent sources of intelligence relating to testing 
protocols were identified. 
 Supply chain assurance through 3rd party certification and site visits is 
commonly applied to secure the meat supply chain.  
 Supply chains have been shortened, transparency strengthened, auditing 
increased, traders eliminated, tamper- proofing and testing introduced to 
increase protection by increasing the likelihood of detection and making it 
more difficult for the fraudster. This strongly supports the criteria and 
measures proposed within the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” framework. 
 General agreement was established that authorities should be notified of 
suspected fraud. It was suggested that investigations into fraud should be 
handled covert to avoid driving fraud underground advised.  
 In the main Food Research Associations & Trade Associations were 
identified as means of tracking emerging risks.  
 A dis-joint was identified between industry response and those from 
Trading Standards & Public Analyst responses re the means of being 
notified of and investigations into fraud.   
 A strong support for the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” approach was 
received.   
 Industry was generally unaware of the National Sampling Programme for 
authenticity. 
 There was a general willingness to share intelligence (strongly subject to 
confidentiality) and participate in a co-ordinated National sampling plan. 
 Indemnity insurance was proposed as a means to protect the entire food 
chain. 
 Unannounced audits were identified as a means to increase likelihood of 
detection of fraudulent activity.  
A 'too good to be true' price pointing mechanism was recommended. 
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Survey 
The project was modified post award of contract to amend the scope to include a 
survey to increase the number of industry participants and allow a more statistical 
approach to information gathering from industry.  
An online survey was developed and circulated to a stakeholder list of industry 
contacts. This included 22 questions using SurveyMonkey to establish industry 
knowledge of food fraud, perceived risks and preventative measures already in place 
to defend against EMA.  
The reason for creating a survey was to seek validation, or otherwise, from 
stakeholders of the key criteria drawn from the literature study and to seek any other 
aspects industry are aware of relating to food fraud as a basis for provoking further 
systematic thought processes and building an intuitive preventative model.  
Prior to circulating the survey to the full stakeholder group it was trialled with the NSF 
consultancy group for evaluation and feedback. Minor modifications were made to 
simplify and clarify the question set. See Appendix 3 – Survey Questions. 
A target list of Technical contacts within Retailers, Manufacturers, Laboratories, 
Public Analysts, Government Agencies was collated and the survey distributed. 
In order to obtain the highest possible number of responses the survey was sent to 
NSF’s database of manufacturers and retailers requesting that the link would be 
forwarded to their suppliers. See Appendix 4 – Survey Circulation List  
Questions and response format were designed to ensure participants were required 
to respond in a positive or negative manner without allowing a neutral option, hence 
response formats of 1-6 and 1-4 were used so as not to allow a middle point to 
select. 
Survey Monkey was used to capture results from which the results were extracted 
and statistically analysed: 
Data treatment:  'I don't know' answers were treated as missing values. 
The underlying data structure for Q1 was investigated using principal component 
analysis with Varimax rotation.  For Qs 2, 3, 6 and 7, hierarchical clustering was used 
with Ward's methods using squared Euclidean distance.  Paired sample t-test was 
used for comparing mean factor scores for Q1.  Mean cluster scores in Qs 2 and 3 
were compared using repeated measures ANOVA (with Sidak correction).  Strength 
of relationships between measures were expressed as Spearman's r. 
Level of statistical significance was set at p < .005 for all tests.  To indicate the 
magnitude of difference or relationship independent of sample size, effect sizes are 
provided for all inferential statistics. Effect sizes were expressed as Cohen's d, r or 
 20 
partial eta square (2). Interpretation of the effect sizes are summarised in Table 1 
(Cohen, 1988; Rosenthal, 1996).  
Table 1: Thresholds for interpreting effect sizes  
Statistical test 
Relevant 
effect size 
Effect size threshold 
  Small Medium Large Very 
large 
Mean difference D 0.200 0.500 0.800 1.300 
 2 0.010 0.059 0.138  
Correlation R 0.100 0.300 0.500 0.700 
 
Data analyses were performed with IBM SPSS version 19.0. Effect sizes were 
calculated using Wilson's online Practical Meta-Analysis Effect Size Calculator 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001), available from:  
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/escalc/html/EffectSizeCalculator-Home.php; 
and for paired sample t-test: 
http://www.cognitiveflexibility.org/effectsize/effectsizecalculator.php 
For repeated measures, calculations were corrected for dependence among means 
in order to make direct comparisons to effect sizes from between-subjects studies 
using Morris and DeShon's correction (Morris & DeShon, 2002). 
Survey Results  
To enhance information obtained from stakeholders via face to face interviews and 
two seminars a questionnaire was developed and circulated to industry 
representatives. 
The full sample size was n = 91.  
See Appendix 3 for full details of Survey Questions. 
Appendix 5 provides detail of the respondents industry sector and experience. 
 
Physical state of the food 
Participants were asked to score various physical states of foods with respect to 
ease of food fraud perpetrated 
84 participants answered  
1303 individual question responses obtained 
106 I don’t know responses (8%) 
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Figure 3: Mean score of responses to show ease of fraud in relation to physical state 
of food. 
 
Figure 4: Percentage ‘I don’t know’ responses per physical state. 
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Underlying structure was detected using principal component analysis with Varimax 
rotation.  Factors were first extracted using eigenvalue > 1 criterion, then the number 
of meaningful factors to be retained was determined using Horn's parallel analysis     
(Horn,1965; O’Connor, 2000; Kaiser,1974) comparing the sample eigenvalues to 
eigenvalues generated from random numbers (Figure 3).  The number of factors 
above the random number eigenvalue line were considered real factors and thus 
retained. 
The presence of factor and sampling adequacy were tested using Bartlett's test of 
sphericity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy, 
respectively. 
Assumptions: 
Bartlett's 2 (120) = 33.569, p < .001 clearly indicated that the data contained 
detectable factors (components) with the adequacy of the sampling (KMO = .659) is 
above the minimum 0.5. Using the Kaiser (1974) characterization of KMO values, 
where KMO = 0.00 to 0.49 is unacceptable; 0.50 to 0.59 is miserable; 0.60 to 0.69 is 
mediocre; 0.70 to 0.79 is middling; 0.80 to 0.89 is meritorious and 0.90 to 1.00 is 
marvellous, it can be declared that the present KMO value of 0.66 is acceptable but 
mediocre. 
The initial principal component analysis identified 5 factors with each eigenvalue > 1 
which cumulatively explained 68.4% of the total variances.  Although the first 4 
factors were above the random number's eigenvalue line, the 3rd and 4th factors 
were very close (Figure 5).  Therefore, principal component analysis was run again 
with only two factors.  Factor loadings and factors for the 4 and 2 factor solutions are 
displayed in Table 3. 
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Figure 5: Sample eigenvalues plotted against random number eigenvalues (based on 
100 correlation matrices, principal component analysis, 95% confidence interval, 
seed: 1000)
 
Table 3: Four factor solution of people's perception of food state characteristics for 
ease/difficulty to commit food fraud 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
Frozen .786 .009 .038 -.049 
Fresh .730 .185 .193 -.210 
Solid .729 .198 -.197 -.018 
Dried .638 .155 -.089 .301 
Prepared e.g. filleted, pureed, minced .491 .194 .290 .196 
Liquid .485 -.006 .312 -.029 
Characteristic flavour .231 .899 .136 .073 
Characteristic colour .020 .889 .035 .014 
Characteristic texture .191 .886 .209 .050 
Mixed consistency -.123 .081 .781 .000 
Homogeneous consistency .060 .223 .624 -.036 
Ground .443 .204 .597 .119 
Powder .496 -.314 .504 .212 
Non-characteristic colour .151 .188 .092 .834 
Whole food item - e.g. whole fish, apple, 
carcass 
.366 .283 .189 -.638 
Colourless .091 .431 .205 .446 
Cumulative explained variance = 61.7%; negative factor loading indicate 
reversed scoring (compared to the other variables). 
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Table 4: Two factor solution of people's perception of food state characteristics for 
ease/difficulty to commit food fraud 
 
Component 
1 2 
Characteristic flavour .913 .155 
Characteristic texture .912 .143 
Characteristic colour .861 -.075 
Colourless .542 .099 
Non-characteristic colour .355 .144 
Homogeneous consistency .355 .237 
Mixed consistency .255 .133 
Frozen .040 .748 
Fresh .213 .727 
Powder -.125 .666 
Solid .169 .595 
Ground .373 .587 
Liquid .081 .558 
Dried .206 .548 
Prepared e.g. filleted, pureed, minced .307 .531 
Whole food item - e.g. whole fish, apple, carcass .216 .377 
Cumulative explained variance = 42.8%. 
 
Factors obtained from the two-factor solution (Table 3) suggest that Factor 1 
represents 'colour and consistency' and Factor 2 represents 'physical state'.  One 
item (Mixed consistency) had a low factor loadings on both factors thus omitted from 
further analysis. Using this categorisation, the mean scores from each factor were 
compared.  The means scores suggest that physical state (mean score = 4.26±0.64) 
were considered as a lesser barrier to food fraud than colour and consistency (mean 
score =3.70±0.83). The difference between the mean scores were tested using 
paired sample t-test.  The difference was statistically significant (t(49)= 4.77, p < 
.001, d = 0.689). The two factors showed a medium but statistically significant, 
positive correlation (r =.389, p = .005). The medium-to-large effect size for 
comparison indicates a practically significant and meaningful difference. 
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Figure 6:  Comparison of the mean scores from the two empirical factors. Bars 
(whiskers) represent standard deviations. 
 
 
The results show industry opinion that Liquid, Ground, Prepared and powdered 
products lend themselves to adulteration, which supports the findings identified from 
the literature review.  
Profit 
Participants were asked to estimate of the amount of profit associated to ingredient 
types with the proviso that partial or full adulteration of the item is undertaken. 
75 participants answered 
1943 individual question responses obtained 
203 I don’t know responses (10%) 
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Figure 7: Mean Profit score attributed to ingredient categories. 
 
High value items were selected by participants as those with the highest profit 
associated. Alcohol, Poultry and Chocolate scored highest. These results are in line 
with the literature review conducted. 
The reduction in participants answering this question and increase in the number of 
respondents selecting I don’t know potentially indicates a lower confidence level of 
the industry when scoring profit. This could be due to category specific knowledge of 
the individuals participating hence they are confident to score the products they have 
experience compared to those they have no experience with.  
Figure 6 shows the cluster formation process based on profitability of adulteration, 
resulting in 3 sub-clusters (labelled as A, B & C) and 2 main clusters (labelled as 
Cluster 1 and Cluster 2).  Cluster 1 is equivalent to subclusters A, whereas the larger 
cluster 2 incorporated subclusters B and C.   
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Figure 8: Hierarchical cluster formation of the 26 food commodities based on 
profitability assessments 
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Likelihood of detection 
Using the participant’s knowledge of current testing methodology available to detect 
adulteration participants were asked to score the likelihood of detection by authorities 
or purchaser for ingredient types. 
63 participants answered 
1630 individual question responses obtained 
290 I don’t know responses (18%) 
Figure 9: Mean Score of Likelihood of detection attributed to product categories. 
 
Unsurprisingly Red Meat was selected by participants as the category whose 
adulteration was most likely to be detected currently. Alcohol and Poultry are also 
identified as items if adulterated that would likely be detected.  
The reduction in participants answering this question and increase in the number of 
respondents selecting I don’t know may indicate a lower confidence level or reflect 
industry category specialisation.  
Figure 10 shows the cluster formation process based on the likelihood of detection, 
resulting in 4 sub-clusters (labelled as A, B, C & D) and 2 main clusters (labelled as 
Cluster 1 and Cluster 2).  Cluster 1 contains subclusters A and B, whereas the larger 
cluster 2 incorporated subclusters C and D.  The common character of subcluster A 
and B is clear, each represent a type of foodstuff: varieties of meat in cluster A and 
alcoholic beverages for cluster B. The common factors in clusters C and D are less 
clear. 
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Figure 10:  Hierarchical cluster formation of the 26 food commodities based on ease 
of detection assessments 
 
Comparison of clusters from Q2 and 3 
Despite that the two concept is expected to be inversely related (i.e., high likelihood 
of detection increases the 'cost' and thus lowers the expected profit), Figures 9 and 
10 show that the same 26 food commodities were perceived somewhat differently for 
profitability from adulteration and the likelihood of detection of adulteration.  Mean 
cluster scores, along with test statistics (repeated measures ANOVA) are shown in 
Table 5. (Note: In Q2, the response scale is downward bias, i.e., score 4 represent 
the medium on a 6-point scale). 
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D 
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Table 5: Summary table of within subjects comparisons of clusters from Q2 and Q3 
individually; n = 55 for Q2 and n = 35 for Q3; high score indicates high profitability 
  Mean ± SD Test statistics 
and 
significance 
Effect 
size 
(partial 
2) 
Profit Cluster 1 (also 
A) 
4.7477 ± 
0.51172 
t(54)= 13.349,  
p < .001 
1.919 
 Cluster 2 3.6970 ± 
0.73639 
 
 Subcluster B 3.2545 ± 
0.87725 
F(2,53)= 
103.549, 
p < .001;  
A > B; B > C, A 
> C at p < .001 
0.796 
 Subcluster C 3.8671 ± 
0.73402 
 
Likelihood of 
detection 
Cluster 1 3.0400 ± 
0.95769 
t(34)= -4.212,  
p < .001 
0.723 
 Cluster 2 3.7347 ± 
0.75295 
 
 Subcluster A 3.1048 ± 
0.95579 
F(3,32)= 5.839, 
p = .003 
A = B (p = .976) 
A < C (p = .008) 
A < D (p = .002) 
C > B (p = .023) 
D > B (p = .009) 
D = C (p = .681) 
0.354 
 Subcluster B 2.9429 ± 
1.38676 
 
 Subcluster C 3.6738 ± 
0.77052 
 
 Subcluster D 3.8159± 
0.86022 
 
 
Despite the small sample size, differences between the two main clusters, as well as 
between the subclusters within each question were statistically significant. The very 
large (Q2) and large (Q3) effect sizes for Question 2 confirms that the difference is, in 
fact, quite substantial in practical terms as well. 
To facilitate examining the relationships between the clusters between clusters of 
Question 2 and Question 3, the full correlation matrix is displayed in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Correlation coefficients (statistically significant correlations are in bold) 
 
 
 
Cluster 
B 
(Profit) 
Cluster 
C 
(profit) 
Cluster 
A 
(detecti
on) 
Cluster 
B 
(detecti
on) 
Cluster 
C 
(detecti
on) 
Cluster 
D 
(detecti
on) 
Cluster A 
(Profit) 
r .372 .586 .143 .078 .169 .090 
  p .003 < .000 .329 .597 .325 .584 
  n 62 56 49 48 36 39 
Cluster B 
(Profit) 
r   .726 .011 -.359 -.325 -.273 
  p   < .000 .938 .011 .053 .088 
  n   58 50 49 36 40 
Cluster C (profit) r     .009 -.050 -.311 -.143 
  p     .954 .746 .078 .384 
  n     45 45 33 39 
Cluster A 
(detection) 
r       .333 .387 .319 
  p       .019 .015 .042 
  n       49 39 41 
Cluster B 
(detection) 
r         .297 .170 
  p         .067 .293 
  n         39 40 
Cluster C 
(detection) 
r           .658 
  p           < .000 
  n           35 
Note: Q2 - high score represent high profit; Q3 - high score represent less likely to be 
detected 
 
The very large (Q2) and large (Q3) effect sizes for Question 2 confirms that the 
difference is, in fact, quite substantial in practical terms as well.  
The mean scores of Profit and Likelihood of detection were plotted to provide the 
participants ‘gut feel’ placement of ingredient categories on the draft food fraud 
model.  
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Figure 11: Placement of ingredient categories on draft fraud model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 depicts the relationships between each food commodities based on 
assessment for profit level and likelihood of detection.  Congruently with the identified 
clusters, spirits, wine and meat varieties dominated the left upper quadrant of high 
profit and high likelihood of detection. Cheese, Fats and oils, Egg and Milk powder 
were plotted in the top right quadrant- the most desirable scenario for a fraudster.  
The opposite, least desirable, end is occupied by commodities such as coffee, fruit 
and liquid dairy products. 
The above plot will be used within the model development to verify whether industry 
‘gut feel’ is aligned with the EU Top 10 (as informed by the NCFPD Database 
reviewed) and the proposed “NSF Fraud Protection Model” systematic risk 
assessment model, necessary as a foundation to provide a predictive mechanism for 
collective industry improvement.  
Methodology undertaken to assist with the detection of adulteration 
This question was designed to identify the methodology in use in industry to assist in 
detecting food fraud to ensure that the project team were aware of all potential 
analytical and organoleptic methods in use. 
43 Responses were collected: 
The responses obtained were heavily biased towards species adulteration.  
No additional techniques, tools or analytical methods were identified that had not 
been identified in the literature study. 
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Participants were asked to score profit and risk of detection for well-known 
cases of adulteration. 
This question was designed to ascertain the likely plotting of well-known high profile 
cases of food adulteration on the draft model and to validate the model. 
Table 7: Profit & Risk Score for well-known incidents  
 
 Incident Profit 
Score 
Risk 
Score 
Horsemeat sold as 
beef 
5.08 4.67 
Sudan 1 in Chilli 
Powder 
4.02 4.55 
Melamine in Milk 
Powder 
4.47 4.31 
Methanol in Alcohol 5.02 3.85 
Adulteration of Honey 4.50 4.56 
Pomegranate Juice 
adulterated with Apple 
2.94 4.76 
 
 
Figure 12: Well Known Incidents plotted on draft model 
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Mean results indicate that all incidents scored by industry would fall into the most 
appealing quadrant on the draft model, hence validating the thought processes 
informed by the literature review. 
Important factors in the fraudster’s decision to commit fraud 
Informed by the literature study, participants were asked to score criteria identified as 
key contributors to the decision to perpetrate fraud. 
Table 8: Key contributors to perpetrate fraud 
Importance of below in a fraudster’s 
decision to commit fraud? 
Mean Score 
 1 Not Important at all  
4 Very Important 
The physical state of the item 3.15 
High level of supply chain assurance 3.15 
Availability of adulterant 3.52 
Process of adulteration/substitution 3.43 
Labelling 2.43 
 
 
Figure 13: Factors in the fraudster’s decision to commit fraud 
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The perceived importance of motivators and deterrents are depicted in Figure 13.  
The key motivator appears to be the availability and the process of the adulterant or 
substitution.  The relative low score, coupled with the wide spread is notable, 
particularly in the view of Figure 8. 
Figure 14: Perceived importance of motivators and deterrents 
 
 
 
Comparison of the perceived importance of these motivators and deterrent factors by 
Q13 is displayed in Figure 14.  Respondent who answered Q13 affirmatively 
considered four of the five factors less important, but labelling.  However, there was 
no statistically significant difference in perception of importance for factors 
enticing/deterring from adulteration, but in some cases it might be due to the small 
sample size (n = 23).  Test statistics and effect sizes are given below: 
 The physical state of the item: t(20) = 0.598, p = .557, d = 0.258 
 High level of supply chain assurance: t(21) = -.033, p = .974, d = 0.014 
 Availability of adulterant: t(12.7) = 1.729, p = .108, d = 0.802 
 Process of adulteration/substitution: t(21) = .132, p = .896, d = 0.055 
 Labelling: t(21) = -1.227, p = .233, d = 0.513 
 
Two of the five factors, availability of the adulterant and labelling exhibited medium to 
strong effect size.   
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Figure 15:  Comparison of perceived importance of factors in enticing/deterring fraud 
by Q13 
 
 
There were 44 responses (48.4%). 
Figure 15 shows the cluster formation process  based on the likelihood of detection, 
resulting in 3 clusters provisionally names as 'cost/benefit' ('can I do it?'), 'others' and 
'product'.  Of these three, factors grouped in Cluster 1 were perceived to be the most 
important, followed by items in Cluster 2 and 3, respectively (Figure 16).  The 
difference between the three clusters were statistically significant (F(2,42)= 59.034, p 
< .001 , partial 2= 0.738; Cluster 1 > Cluster 2 (p < .001); Cluster 2 > Cluster 3 (p = 
.002) and Cluster 1 > Cluster 3 (p < .001). 
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Figure 16: Hierarchical cluster formation of the 20 motivators/deterrents 
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Figure 17: Comparison of cluster mean scores (high score represent high 
importance) 
 
 
 
Supply of Retail and Branded product and Impact on means and Q3 
Mean scores for each food commodities, as well as for the clusters were compared 
depending on whether the respondents supply retailer own product (Q13).   
Note:  There are only 23 responses (25.3%) for this question, of which 11 responded 
'yes' and 12 responded 'no'.  
 
With the exception for likelihood of detection in poultry and red meat (Q3), there was 
no significant effect for Q13.  However, the sample size was very small which may 
result in non-significant test results for otherwise meaningful difference.   
Tools and information sources the participant is aware of to assist in the 
detection and prevention of food fraud 
The Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) import control system was 
identified as an additional source of information that had not previously been 
reviewed that warrants further consideration.  
Details of mechanism to alert of ‘too good to be true’ pricing (Price Pointing) 
63% of respondents stated that a mechanism was not in place to alert of too good to 
be true pricing offered by suppliers. 
The answers to this question were vague with very few direct answers to the 
question given. Key themes were specifications, long term relationships, systems 
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along the whole chain, unannounced audit, benchmarking and intimate knowledge of 
market pricing. 
This potentially indicates a lack of Governance & oversight or disconnect of internal 
departments, i.e. buying and sourcing could potentially have mechanisms in place 
however the respondent’s predominantly technical contacts are unaware of such. 
Measures to protect against fraud in use 
Figure 18: Measures in place to protect against food fraud 
 
 
Results show that only 19% of respondents include fraud within their product risk 
assessment, with a lower percentage of 9% monitoring intelligence relating to food 
fraud. This potentially identifies a key shortfall in the industry.  
Responses to this question support the themes drawn from the literature review  
Further comments pertinent to report 
Claims were identified as a key theme for further exploration; Halal, Organic and 
Country of Origin were identified as key.  
The approach of National Agencies and their handling of food fraud was identified as 
a key aspect for further focus, participants identified that agencies were not 
necessarily taking a business friendly approach but business were scared of 
enforcement authorities. 
Guidance on how businesses can avoid food fraud was requested to be made readily 
available 
Purchasing 
Policy e.g. 
direct 
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Risk Assessment 
19% 
Audit of behalf of 
your organisation 
17% 
Fraud specific 
audit 
3% 
Testing 
15% 
Intelligence 
gathering to 
inform policy 
9% 
Alerted if 
purchase price 
too low 
0% 
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Economic climate of a country was identified as a potential driver for individuals to 
commit adulteration as everybody is looking for the cheapest price in order to 
survive. 
A centralized 'whistle-blowing' facility specific to the food industry should be 
considered. The major UK retailers all have their own systems, but they are too 
focused on their own brand protection, rather than the big national / international 
picture which came to light in horse-gate.  They would be better off investing this 
resource into a specialist food fraud unit, ideally under the auspices of the FSA or 
some other government agency rather than their own private interests, or umbrella 
bodies such as BRC or the Food and Drink Federation. Neither of these can really be 
trusted by the public, as they exist only to protect and promote their members' 
interests. 
The role of discount retailing and retail buyer’s pressures and retailer margins   
Customer expectations in terms of pricing. Lack of regulatory enforcement 
capabilities 
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Phase 3: Initial Assessment Framework  
Framework Population  
A five-point scale used to define and map the key parameters of the framework was 
designed and tested against a number of food categories.  These food categories 
were selected to cover as broad a range of the framework criteria as possible: Beef 
Trim (pre- and post- the horsemeat crisis), Saffron, Coffee, Wheat, Potatoes and 
Olive Oil were tested  against the framework to establish its ability to identify foods, 
most and least likely to be targeted by fraudsters. 
The project team met to discuss the findings and to incorporate additional metrics 
within the proposed framework from the information gained during the research 
phase. The model was adapted as an iterative process to reflect the motivation for 
the fraudster to commit the crime, hence increasing the likelihood of a risk to 
industry.  
The model remained based on a Boston Consulting Group (BCG) type Matrix as 
originally intended although the project team felt that a MARCI style model might also 
be appropriate as a visual means of displaying and formatting risk assessments. 
The BCG style chart is particularly useful when the primary purpose of the 
prioritization exercise is for risk response: risks plotting the farthest in the upper right 
quadrant represent the highest impact and risk and would benefit the most from 
additional management effectiveness in managing the risks (COSO, 2012).  
A MARCI style chart remains an option or alternative for the visual display of data. 
Developing the Metrics 
In each case, the indicative criteria included within the assessment table are ranked 
from 1-5, where 1 is the least attractive or beneficial to the fraudster and where 5 is 
the most attractive.  
Likelihood of detection is calculated as an average score from the criteria & plotted 
on the x axis and profit is calculated as an average score and plotted on the y axis. 
Difficulty to the Fraudster is represented by the size of the circle or plot on the model 
calculated from an average score as small (1-2), medium (2.1-3.5) or large (3.6-5). 
Quadrants 
Categories falling into the top right quadrant (High Profit & low likelihood of 
Detection) are the most attractive to fraudsters – denoted graphically by the largest 
pile of coins.  
Categories falling into the top left quadrant (High Profit & High likelihood of Detection) 
are attractive but carry a high risk of detection – denoted by the second largest pile of 
coins. 
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Categories falling into the bottom right quadrant (Low Profit & Low likelihood of 
Detection) – denoted by the smallest pile of coins. 
Categories falling into the bottom left quadrant (Low Profit & High Likelihood of 
Detection), least desirable to the fraudster & lowest risk to the industry- denoted  by a 
crossed-out £ sign. 
Figure 19: Proposed Fraud Framework 
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Scale Derivation 
1. Profit  
Initially, the project team planned to examine the return on investment (ROI) to the 
criminal as a measure of profitability and financial attractiveness.  This is a difficult 
concept to put into practice, and the literature sources state aspirations for measuring 
profitability and economic gain, rather than offering a model to do so.  In order to 
measure profitability, information is needed about the investment made to carry out 
the adulteration, mis-labelling or substitution and about the process costs involved. 
Another approach was to adapt target cost models to indicate where potential for 
economic gain exists.  This type of model works backwards from market price to the 
target cost that the producer has to achieve in order to make a desired profit.  The 
margins of retailers and intermediaries, as well as full cost of production and 
distribution at each stage are deducted to calculate the desired cost.  The model 
highlights very clearly the motivation for producers and intermediaries to engage in 
economically motivated adulteration, particularly with the downward pressure on 
prices highlighted in the Elliott Report (2013).  
However, this was complex for the initial static model in development.  Therefore, a 
more basic approach was adopted to build up the concept of profit and then 
profitability from first principles. 
The first step was to use publically available commodity data from indexmundi.com; 
meatprices.co.uk; indianspice.com and FT.com to derive a cost per kilogramme for 
each commodity (£/kg).  This required adjustments to data which was quoted in 
different currencies and weights.  The £/kg was then ranked from the highest 
(Saffron) to the lowest (Oats).  This ranking demonstrated immediately the potential 
for profit between known fraudulent substitutions such as olive oil and peanut oil, or 
salmon and other fish. 
Cost of Commodity and adulterant 
Two key criteria were developed: cost of the commodity and cost of adulterant, using 
a reasonable division of the prices on the £/kg ranking. 
Premium 
The third criterion chosen was whether or not a premium was available for the 
product.  The rationale is that the higher the potential mark up by the retailer or 
intermediary, the greater the margin for profit available to the criminal.  The literature 
search shows that the foods most likely to be adulterated are premium products such 
as olive oil, honey, alcohol etc. 
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Sales Volume 
The fourth criterion is currently sales volume, as a proxy for the amount that could be 
sold.  This is problematic, because it is a relative figure that depends on whether a 
large amount can be sold through a retailer or through small shops or the Internet.  
The project team propose further refinement of this criterion to produce an economic 
measure of demand for the product.  Other factors relating to volume are covered in 
the Ease/Difficulty dimension of the matrix, including access to a supply chain or 
market. 
Table 9: Profit Metric and Criteria 
 
2. Likelihood of Detection  
Eight criteria were identified on the strength of the information reviewed.  
Previous/ reports /Incidents: Reports of EMA incidents in any category frequently 
recur at varying frequencies.  This is often reflective of the fraudsters changing the 
nature of the adulterant, so avoiding detection.  Once detected, the likelihood of 
subsequent detection is increased through routine testing and surveillance by 
industry and regulators such that that particular adulterant is no longer attractive, until 
industry focus and attention is distracted.  
The pattern within the scale currently defined provides a starting point for the model. 
It should become clearer now that fraud has attracted much more attention from the 
industry and databases have recently been set up to allow analysis of the data not 
previously possible. 
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Purchasing/Trading Specification: Since the Fraudsters intentionally set out to 
avoid detection, the likelihood of detection is inverse to the sophistication of the 
specification. 
Testing Frequency: The less often testing is carried out, the less likely the 
detection. 
Supply Chain Complexity: The complexity of the global supply network has 
increased the vulnerability to fraud. The more complex the supply chain the easier it 
is for the fraudster to avoid detection. 
Supply Chain Integrity/Assurance: It is easiest to perpetrate a crime in businesses 
that have the least level of assurance. There is currently little if any difference in risk 
to the fraudster as a consequence of assurance since fraud controls are only now 
being introduced through GFSI following the Horsemeat crisis. The current shift 
towards unannounced audits may help to put paid to some localised fraud in the 
interim. 
Test Efficacy: Fraud is often revealed with the introduction of new technology (e.g. 
Isotope testing of origin), the nature of the adulterant is also changed to avoid the 
detection method used (e.g. melamine in milk) or the target of the test is removed 
(e.g. Filtering honey). This scale is reflective of the available tests to detect the 
nature of the intended fraud. 
Health Hazard: Fraudsters do not intend to cause harm since this would provide an 
alert and increase the likelihood of detection. 
Deterrent: Soft penalties for food fraud make it an attractive alternative to criminals 
compared to other types of crime. The penalty of being caught will however be a part 
of the decision making process. 
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Table 10: Detection Metrics and Criteria 
 
3. Difficulty  
Four criteria were identified from the literature review and analysis of the databases. 
Physical State: Liquid adulteration with liquid is common and physically the easiest 
to perform. Grinding of e.g. spices into powders makes it easier to carry out and less 
likely to be spotted. Recent experiences highlight the higher risk from frozen 
materials where blocks are less likely to be scrutinised than chilled. Entire items are 
least likely as a target (e.g. Fish are filleted; Fruit is pulped or juiced).  
Availability of adulterants/ substitutes: The nature of the adulterant depends on 
how available it is locally and its relative cost hence profit. This can range from 
addition of freely available materials e.g. water & organic matter, to relatively cheaper 
substitutes (e.g. industrial salt, alternative juices, oils & fish/meat species) and non-
food chemical availability & cost (e.g. fake eggs & rice; melamine purchase 
restricted). 
Ease of adulteration/substitution: Many incidents occur prior to packaging of any 
description in bulk form due to dilution & mixing. Thereafter re-labelling requires little 
effort & investment, followed by freezing which requires more specialist equipment 
and re-packing (often in conjunction with re-labelling and/or freezing) become 
sequentially more difficult/ less attractive to the fraudster 
Labelling/Tamper-proofing: Many incidents occur prior to packaging of any 
description in bulk form. The difficulty thereafter increases progressively with respect 
to packaging type, contents / quantity & integrity.  
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Table 11: Difficulty Metrics and criteria 
 
Validation 
A number of food items selected for their differing properties and involvement in 
previous incidents were ran through the model. Initial calculation based on average 
prices and margins does place items close to where expected in the literature and in 
the perceptions survey.   
However, the concern is that there are very few items where an economic return 
could not be made through fraudulent means.  This suggests that either we need to 
weight the criteria and that even very basic commodities such as root crops or 
cereals could be subject to adulteration. 
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Figure 20: Model Validation  
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Phase 4: Organisational Validation 
The review also explored how the model once created could be used in practice and 
how information might be shared between industry and regulators whilst maintaining 
confidentiality as appropriate. 
A presentation was given by the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” team members of the 
background and development of the project to date at the user group meeting. 
Attendees were provided with hand outs of the ‘gut feel’ output from the industry 
survey and model framework and associated criteria for profit, detection and 
difficulty. 
Industry representatives were asked collectively and individually for their reaction to 
the framework and their comments have been collated and summarised below:  
Meeting Feedback Summary 
The model as presented was considered to be reflective of current Best Practice 
adopted amongst the attendees. User group felt adoption of the model would be 
beneficial as a systematic mechanism, particularly for businesses beyond the reach 
of the major retailers for example for SMEs that can’t afford the resource and 
expertise that retailers have access to. 
The overriding message from the group was the need for a dynamic picture and 
customisation for business needs.  
Post - Meeting feedback summary 
A feedback form was circulated after the meeting requesting recommendations for 
improvement and commentary on the model metrics, additional criteria, data source 
recommendations, ideas for dynamic improvements. 
Further comments were obtained from 1:1 meetings with representatives of three 
leading supermarket retailers. 
Responses were analysed and investigated by the group and enhancements 
identified for further exploration as part of the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” 
development. 
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Phase 5: Proposal for Development of “NSF Fraud Protection Model” 
Revised and Final Metrics 
The three tables below set out the revised and final metrics for the developed model. 
Table 12: Final Profit Metrics 
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Table 13: Final Detection Metrics 
 
 
Table 14: Final Difficulty Metrics  
 
 
Model Key Criteria Improvements 
 Profit  
Other criteria could be included and assessed, such as increased/decreased cost of 
processing as a result of the adulteration ranging from 5 adding water / cheap 
relabeling and so most attractive to the criminal through to 1 involving significant 
investment and so unattractive.  However, this is skewed by the presence of money 
laundering among organised criminals: the investment in the factory or its processes 
may be due to money laundering and therefore, the return on operating cost or 
investment is less an issue. 
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Further work to develop this initial phase of the model would include: 
 Building economic criteria for supply and demand based on production figures.  
Indicators of where deficits in premium commodities appear and where 
surpluses of cheaper substitutes appear would allow us to measure the 
opportunity existing for the criminal (which would give a red flag for retailers 
and others).  However, these need to be understood on a commodity by 
commodity basis to allow for storage. 
 Building criteria for fluctuations in price and significant movements in price 
indices based on economic data.  These can be affected by food speculation 
and care needs to be taken in their use, particularly for volatile items.   
 Considering weighting the averages. 
It is proposed to use the University of Portsmouth access to Bloomberg to widen the 
number of commodities examined and to test the feasibility of easily extracting 
economic data.  Publically available economic data is highly aggregated and lags 
behind in terms of availability.  Therefore, we need to search for a cost effective way 
of making the data available through a dynamic model. 
 Detection 
Reported/Previous Incidents. 
Fraud history is relevant and supported by the literature review and industry 
feedback general confidence was obtained that the outer score points were 
appropriate. However  further evidence is required to ensure 2-4 are suitably 
placed, due to the immaturity of fraud incident collation and focus the data is not 
available to make any further changes at this stage and to answer the question  
posed at the user group ‘Is it a straight line relationship as incidents may cause 
copycats and perversity?’ 
Test efficacy: It is recommended that the metric should be split into 2 maintaining 
efficacy with carrying criteria ranging from not available through to 
specific/effective testing. Test cost to be introduced as the feedback from the user 
group provided confirmation that the cost of testing is inversely proportionate to 
the amount of testing conducted. 
Testing frequency: It is recommended to remove unavailable from Score 5 as a 
duplication of the test efficacy criterion. 
Deterrent and Health Hazard: These were considered to be precursors to the 
decision to perpetrate a fraud hence were removed from the final proposed 
model. The impact of the fraud on health to consumer should be considered as an 
additional metric for future development. 
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 Difficulty 
No changes were identified that required amendments to the initially proposed 
criteria and metrics. 
The “NSF Fraud Protection Model” model aims to provide a proactive approach to 
the potential for fraud.  The scope of this project was to produce a static model and 
the project team have done this.  
How to use the model 
We anticipate that small food safety and integrity teams situated in food businesses, 
trade associations and possibly regulators can use the model to assess the relative 
susceptibility of a range of food products to fraudulent attack. This is in turn helps 
focus limited resource on intervention methods such as enhanced testing and 
auditing.   
The project team themselves found the most useful way to apply the model was to 
form a small group with as broad technical and product expertise as possible to then 
assess products individually reaching a team consensus on scoring the three 
assessment criteria. Ideally we recommend a team including: 
 A Product category specialist who understand the relevant food technologies 
 An individual with forensic or laboratory expertise who understand testing 
 Financial knowledge of the products  (Category buyers would be ideal)  
 A facilitator with broad industry experience 
In our experience the project team select categories of food and collectively and 
quickly came to conclusions as to how to position them on the model. 
We anticipate that assessing most foods for the purpose of initial plotting on the 
framework would take around 15 minutes per item allowing 4 per hour sometimes a 
little more when there is rapid agreement. Realistically 4 persons working in 3 hour 
blocks of time each day using a paper based static method could assess 50-60 
products a week. Within a month a major retailer should be able to “map” the relative 
risk of fraudulent attack against the majority of products already identified as 
susceptible on the basis of past attacks plus a substantial number of others i.e. from 
the NCFPD and USP databases. 
This is a time commitment that could be reduced by companies agreeing to share 
lists although this would have to be facilitated in a secure environment, perhaps 
through a trade association since there is obviously some risk that effectively 
mapping relative susceptibility to fraud could be abused if the information falls into 
the wrong hands. 
Eventually we see a library of mapped susceptibility being produced which is  
revisited and updated as circumstances change for example price or detection 
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methods. This could be shared amongst buying and technical teams to heighten 
awareness of fraud potential and to better direct preventive intervention. 
Additional potential for Development 
The originally proposed framework whilst modified has remained essentially intact in 
terms of its key metrics and visual design. However, stakeholder consultation 
particularly with industry representatives has identified and clarified several potential 
broad areas for enhancement and innovation. These are: 
Enhancing the metrics 
1. By increasing the complexity of the model and or the proposed measurement 
indices to take account of a wider set of factors that may influence decisions to 
commit fraud. However this has a downside since complexity will tend to make 
practical use, particularly by industry less likely as it increases costs and slows 
reaction time. However, converting the paper based framework to an online 
intranet enabled version would speed use and facilitate sharing within an 
organisation. 
Using Information Technology 
One proposal to tackle this problem is to create a layered approach with the 
complexity of analysis increasing as the sample size decreases as shown in Figure 
21 below. 
Figure 21 Layered process to manage analysis volume 
 
2. By using information technology to enhance the frameworks ability to respond in 
real time to changing market conditions for example price or trading volumes and 
to make data entry and assessments easier through automated processes. For 
example scoring. 
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Integration with other Tools 
Enhancements associated with the use of technology both to input data in real time 
particularly trading data in terms of volume and price would be very helpful but also 
using technology to automate and simplify the input process and underlying 
framework metrics for example using touch screen or tablet style applications.  
3. By integrating the framework with other tools identified as part of the project 
research to provide a comprehensive “dashboard” that predicts, tracks and 
detects food fraud at the earliest opportunity.  
Further enhancement could be achieved through the creation of and linking up of a 
whole series of integrated assessment models, intelligence gathering and platforms 
for deciding potential impact and appropriate intervention subsequent to identifying a 
product is particularly vulnerable or relatively attractive to fraudsters.  
Potential Adulterants - Link to adulterant used is required as food safety risk may 
be introduced at this stage e.g. Allergen, Carcinogen e.g. Sudan I, Other severe 
health hazard e.g. Melamine. The adulterant used by the fraudster is key to each of 
the metrics proposed within the model, we therefore propose that further work is 
conducted to identify adulterants previously used vs product commodities and 
importantly highlight potential unknown adulterants. We are aware of useful sources 
of information to assist with this task namely USP database and NCFPD 
Susceptibility database which identify items likely to be targeted. 
 “NSF Fraud Protection Model” International Collaborative Intelligent Platform 
The current “NSF Fraud Protection Model” uses a simple chart for visual impact, 
would be developed to include indicators relating to changes in supply and demand 
for both products and substitutes.  In its dynamic form, the model would draw on risk 
data from the network analysis tools to highlight specific changing areas of concern 
to the industry, in order to shift from reactive to preventative action. 
Technology  
Two methods and software types have been identified – Gap Minder & Predictive 
Analytics – that would potentially enable the framework to become a dynamic 
platform capable of delivering near real-time intelligence on areas at highest risk food 
fraud at different points in time.  
Gapminder is a freely available model which demonstrates changes between data 
over periods of time.  It is demonstrated by Professor Hans Rosling on 
http://www.gapminder.org/. 
Predictive Analytics/Big Data 
A network analytical tool has been developed by the project team members from 
Kingston University (Nepusz, Petroczi & Naughton, 2009), for monitoring global food 
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safety using RASFF data.  
Indeed, industries with a full-time focus on fraud (e.g. Banking, Insurance, 
healthcare) have already adopted next generation solutions for predictive analytics.  
This solves the ‘big data’ challenge, provides visibility & Intelligence and facilitates 
the paradigm shift from post-incident forensics to proactive and predictive fraud 
prevention  
Data Science Central is an online resource for big data practitioners. From Analytics 
to Data Integration to Visualization, Data Science Central provides a community 
experience that includes a robust editorial platform, social interaction, forum-based 
technical support, the latest in technology, tools and trends. A specialist section on 
forensic and fraud analytics provides a useful resource. 
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Figure 22: Forensic & Fraud Analytics Tool 
 
 
One of the key features of network analysis is that this will allow harvesting and 
processing the data instantaneously.  In other words, there is not the same need for 
standardised data as there is in certain economic models, although there may be 
some scope to homogenise data.  This gives network analysis a significant time 
advantage over other predictive models. 
Macro-level Data 
To develop the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” further, indicators relating to the 
macro-level environment of the food supply chain need to be incorporated.  Supply 
chains need macro-level environmental information to develop fraud risk 
management tools.  Different authors see potential in the use of global economic 
data in creating predictive models for food fraud.  However, the majority of economic 
databases both lag current events and are highly aggregated. This makes it difficult 
to see where immediate issues of supply and demand which drive both pressures 
and opportunities for food fraud arise. We conclude that web-crawlers, data mining 
and network analysis drawing information on weather, disease, market prices, etc 
would provide a much more immediate picture of upcoming supply and demand 
issues. In the fast moving field of data mining, advances can be expected on a 
monthly basis and thus, a fluid approach is a necessity. For this reason an open 
ended coverage is warranted for these final sections.  
Although different researchers foresee the potential of data analysis, the problems 
involved in collecting, analysing and presenting macro-level data have not been fully 
resolved nor made widely available. 
Peck (2005) emphasises that a resilient network involves much more than the design 
and management of robust supply chain processes. It is important to recognize that 
by taking actions to reduce risk at one point within the four levels, at the same time 
the risk profile for the other levels is changed, including players and stakeholders not 
thought of in the initial risk assessment. Supply chains are dynamic and constantly 
evolving, and so is supply chain risk. Achieving supply chain resilience is a constant 
battle and a never-ending process. 
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Figure 23: Supply Chain Vulnerability4-level model framework (Peck, 2005)  
 
This is described by Jan Husdal as an excellent tool for explaining the scope and 
dynamic nature of supply chain risk (Available at:  
http://www.husdal.com/2008/08/25/drivers-of-supply-chain-vulnerability/) 
In essence, in order to develop the “NSF Fraud Protection Model”, links with Level 4 
data sources are required. These represent a broad macroeconomic perspective, 
political, economic, social, legal and technological factors. Disruptions or sudden 
changes in these factors are more often than not beyond the control of an individual 
company.  
Specifically in relation to food fraud, this is supported by Everstine , Kircher & 
Cunningham (2013) who advise that early warning analysis should take advantage of 
multiple data sources.  This has the potential to alert us to elevated risk of EMA in 
certain food products for relatively few resources. The development of data 
management technologies in which the food and agriculture stakeholders can 
regularly and proactively share real-time information across the globe is key to 
identifying risks and initiating the appropriate response to mitigate adverse 
consequences. 
However, there are problems with accessing this level of data.  Economic databases, 
by their nature, are highly aggregated and can lag real-time information by up to two 
years.  There are economic models that predict criminal activity and risk in food 
supply chains.  However, there is a strong argument for using data analytics rather 
than economic prediction models.  
Two key drivers should be considered when developing the “NSF Fraud Protection 
Model” through to implementation.  
The first is the disaggregated and heterogeneous nature of food fraud data. To 
overcome this challenge, new technologies must be capable of harvesting data from 
multiple sources with minimum delay. Furthermore, the data must be processed in a 
way that routine assessment is possible on very new or even live datasets taken from 
a wide range of sources. It is imperative that the data can be digested in silico to 
provide user friendly outputs at the decision level.   
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Network analysis has strong potential to deliver on this requirement as has already 
been demonstrated in the food safety arena (e.g. Nepusz, Petroczi & Naughton, 
2009; 2012). Several organisations have incorporated Network Analysis into their 
anti-crime activities, including police forces {e.g. 
http://ai.arizona.edu/research/coplink/crimenet.asp}. The science underpinning 
Network Analysis is developing rapidly and future advances will bring the technology 
even closer to regulatory requirements. 
The second driver is the residual need for human decision making. Although machine 
learning is developing, it has yet to be adopted in stand along format in food fraud. In 
the recent authoritative report by the European Food Safety Authority EMRISK Unit 
(EFSA, 2012), there is a report on a pilot study with well thought considerations of 
the balance between data acquisition and judgement calls. In this exemplar study the 
necessity to have i) data rigour and availability, along with ii) appropriately judged 
decision steps is key. The former can be provided by Network Analysis and the latter 
can be underpinned by “NSF Fraud Protection Model” to assist in decision making. A 
key aspect of eth EFSA EMRISK report is the resource required per detection. 
Clearly, this will be a key challenge in times of limited resource.     
Fraud Intelligence Sharing 
Data sharing between stakeholders within the food industry is also currently a major 
stumbling block in the way of progress with shared intelligence considered to be the 
’biggest nut to crack’.  
Integrity and security of DNA testing data shared between industry stakeholders 
during the horsemeat crisis was questionable, using spreadsheets and e-mails. More 
robust and secure methods are required. 
Other industries have overcome conflicts and shared intelligence is custom and 
practice e.g. STEADES for AIATA (Aviation); ECAIRS for Transport; SMIS for the UK 
Rail Sector; NRLS for the UK NHS Health Sector.  The aviation model was identified 
in the GMA Report (2010) as a foundation to build upon.  
Mechanisms for optimising data sharing between stakeholders and maximising 
security from fraudsters needs to be fully considered within the scope of “NSF Fraud 
Protection Model” development.   The following provide background on the potentials 
and pitfalls of intelligence sharing: 
In the post- horsemeat review by Prof. Pat Troop a failure in current intelligence in 
‘joining the dots’ was identified. 
http://www.meatinfo.co.uk/news/fullstory.php/aid/15704/Horsemeat:_FSA_must_impr
ove_intelligence,_says_expert.html?utm_source=newsletter_weekly&utm_medium=e
mail&utm_campaign=Newsletter%2BWeekly%2BIssue%2B241 
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FSA Intelligence sources were identified through interview with the FSA which 
identified the organisational relationships for data inputs as illustrated in the schema 
provided (See Figure 2).  
Limitations on the FSAs Memex Patriarch system were reported in 2011. 
http://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Food-Safety/Intelligent-software-won-t-predict-
next-Sudan-1-experts-warn-
FSA/?c=3eYffeo0PvoBLDnqPxwXug%3D%3D&utm_source=newsletter_daily&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=Newsletter%2BDaily. Further details of the Memex 
system are available at : http://www.itproportal.com/2007/04/19/memex-launches-
new-intelligence-management-tools/ 
The FSA has recently commissioned research on data mapping with Leatherhead 
Food Research (due in March). This should facilitate development of the proposed 
“NSF Fraud Protection Model” Intelligence Platform  
http://www.thegrocer.co.uk/fmcg/fsa-data-project-takes-the-fight-to-horsemeat-style-
food-fraud/353620.article.  
A cloud-based fraud framework for predictive fraud detection in the US Federal 
Subsidy arena gives a useful insight into what an intelligent fraud framework that 
‘connects the dots’ looks like  
http://www.sas.com/resources/whitepaper/wp_41905.pdf 
Insurance industry models 
There is potential to build the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” so that it would be 
available for insurance companies to use in house as well as there being a more 
public face.  Like RASFF, there could be a hidden component for sensitive data. 
The “NSF Fraud Protection Model” could be linked to other commercial risk 
assessment models for example the NOVI product recall system provided by AIG 
insurance  
 NOVISM estimates the financial impact of a product recall caused by an accidental 
product contamination.  
The confidential NOVISM Estimate is the largest probable loss arising from an 
accidental product contamination that occurs during production at the plant level, 
assuming failures of critical control points in the sourcing or manufacturing of the 
company’s product. In insurance terms, the NOVISIM Estimate is also known as a 
Probable Maximum Recall Loss. It includes the value of contaminated products, 
recall expenses, destruction costs and lost profit associated with the contaminated 
products. 
An industry survey carried out in 2012 through a strategic collaboration between 
Campden-BRI and JLT Insurance (New World New Risks, 2013 ) provides an insight 
into the industries perception of current and future risks in the food sector. 
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It provides insight and highly comprehensive and graphical representation of direct 
commercial impacts such as the volatility of commodity prices, and the associated 
industry impacts.  Therefore, we will investigate this further as it parallels the work 
which needs to be done to incorporate price indices and risk in to the profit axis of 
“NSF Fraud Protection Model”.  
Some insurance companies have adopted predictive analytics for fraudulent claims. 
Opportunities should be explored to investigate sharing of intelligence with them. 
This could also provide an incentive for data and intelligence sharing by the industry, 
since recall insurance for horsemeat fraud in the absence of a food safety risk was 
not covered. Adoption of “NSF Fraud Protection Model” into business as usual could 
reduce their insurance risks and premiums.  
Potential sources of data 
Potential sources of data and intelligence which can feed into a dynamic “NSF Fraud 
Protection Model” platform have been identified. Further work on the “NSF Fraud 
Protection Model” would involve more in-depth analysis and testing of the different 
sources of information, and the indicators that provide the more robust analyses. 
The Sigma Vulnerabilities in the Food Chain- A Stakeholder’s  Guide (2009) provides 
guidance on data that provides sensitivity to early warnings and other signals, 
including recall notices and alerts from national databases; alert internet services and 
daily press in order to identify emerging hazards; latest scientific literature or other 
internet information through general search. Various internet links are provided as 
accessed at the time of publication in their Annex 1. Development of “NSF Fraud 
Protection Model” will achieve this consistently and systematically at an industry 
level, otherwise out of reach at an individual business level. 
Everstine, Kircher & Cunningham (2013) describe various data sources, compiled 
and analyzed to detect a signal, can serve as a trigger for decision makers to take 
action.  
The USP (US Pharmacopoeia) & NCFPD (National Collaboratory on Food Protection 
and Defense) food fraud databases are described which have been reviewed within 
objective 2 to build the model framework. A dynamic interface with these tools should 
be sought. 
In addition, this article describes additional data sources such as weather 
information, global trade data, pricing indexes, policy changes, and indications of 
political and civil unrest, whereby algorithms can be built that can assist in identifying 
the environments where food fraud is likely to occur or may already be in the system.  
Other NCFPD technology solutions, known as the FIDES and EMA projects are also 
described: These support data fusion, analytics, and dissemination within and across 
organizations to help identify and warn of food threats such as EMA, provide risk 
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management assessments, and provide decision makers tools to make informed 
assessments and decisions. 
Development of “NSF Fraud Protection Model” should build on existing knowledge 
from these initiatives in order to build a global solution to reflect the challenges of the 
global supply network. 
Everstine et al., (2013) identified a number of incidents where food fraud detection 
has or could have been made earlier through pursuit of tax and other financial data. 
The use of non-traditional data sources for detection are described, such as tax 
records, below-market pricing, rapid increases in supplies and sales or known 
imbalances in quantities between primary production and final distribution. The 
potential for the use of import & trade data, economic production data and market 
pricing data to provide an early indication are also described.    
However, tax and financial data are not publicly available sources of information.  To 
be able to facilitate this approach, there would need to be a significant degree of 
information sharing within supply chains: this degree of information sharing is very 
unusual in food supply chains.  Import and other economic trade and production data 
suffer from time lags in their publication.  However, market movement and pricing 
data has more immediacy. 
Individual tools identified in objectives 2 & 4 would also be included as appropriate: 
Price Indices- Economy Watch http://www.economywatch.com/economic-
statistics/price-index-indicators/  
Global Risks- World Check – Thomson Reuters http://www.world-check.com/our-
services 
Corruption Perceptions Index  
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/corruption_perceptions_index_2012 
BrandView http://www.brandview.com/ 
However, the issue with these tools is that they are not easily accessible, are 
selective and in some cases, highly aggregated.  Whilst price indices movements 
could be incorporated into the profitability criteria for “NSF Fraud Protection Model”, 
other risk indices are not specific enough to highlight commodities or localities where 
alerts are required. 
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Integration of “NSF Fraud Protection Model” framework with Horizon Scanning 
tools  
Drawing in intelligence from the existing horizon scanning tools identified is also an 
imperative. The arena of horizon scanning in food safety is developing with multiple 
stakeholders producing a range of approaches depending on specific needs (as 
outlined, in part, above). It is expected that the necessary drivers of this process will 
increase over the coming years. In parallel, and somewhat less developed, new 
approaches to horizon scanning in food fraud are underdevelopment – including 
“NSF Fraud Protection Model”. Thus, it is a timely stage for co-development of 
models and strategies with a focus on food fraud alongside commensurate 
developments in food safety.      
Social networks/Infodemiology  
‘Infodemiology’ as it develops the analysis of information distributed on the internet- 
could help minimise the impact of incidents in the future.  
It has been reasonable well described in the context of food safety: 
Frank Yiannias reported at the GFSI Conference 2012 that infodemiology is 
emerging as a powerful tool in controlling the spread of foodborne illness. ‘I believe 
food safety is at a crossroads’. One example of infodemiology is Pulse Net which 
analyses DNA subtypes of various pathogens identified in laboratories across the 
US. It is claimed that PulseNet would have avoided the 2008 Salmonella outbreak 
from peanuts which resulted in more than 700 reported illnesses and 9 deaths. 
Infodemiology could also be used to track patterns in internet users searching for 
similar foodborne illness- related terms on search engines, or Twitter users 
discussing their symptoms via tweets (Newkirk et al., 2012). There are three main 
advantages to the use of social media – timeliness, representativeness and self-
identification of outbreaks. Incorporation of existing social media into a public health 
surveillance system certainly has the potential to enhance early outbreak detection.  
FSIS (US Food Safety Inspection Service) have introduced a system of state-specific 
food safety Twitter feeds to help US consumers identify affected products to restrict 
the impact of foodborne outbreaks. 
  
 64 
Conclusion 
The research team see the “NSF Fraud Protection Model” model being used in two 
principal ways. Firstly to validate and reassure product and category teams in the 
technical functions of food companies and also industry regulators that their focus on 
fraud detection in terms of product category is appropriately targeted. The model in 
its current format will bring some structure to what is currently almost entirely based 
on “gut feel” and experience of past experience/incidents.  Secondly the model has a 
predictive quality allowing these same individuals to explore “what if” scenarios as 
trading or market conditions change or when they consider new suppliers and new 
products. 
From the research undertaken it is clear that whilst the global food industry and its 
regulators around the world are increasingly concerned at the nature and extent of 
food fraud the current control measures in place need enhancement with only 19% of 
respondents to our survey including fraud within their risk assessment, only 9% 
monitoring available intelligence on fraud and none using price information to alert 
concern. 
Survey participants also demonstrated either large gaps in their knowledge of fraud 
or an unwillingness to share information. 
Whilst anecdotally companies claim to have considered fraud we found little hard 
evidence or examples of either a systematic or commonly agreed approach to the 
identification and control of the potential vulnerability of specific products to fraud. It 
is therefore not surprising that we found broad and enthusiastic support for the 
principal of a consistent and structured approach to assessing fraud vulnerability.  
We are aware that in its current stage of development the “NSF Fraud Protection 
Model” model is at an early stage and we have discussed various potential 
enhancements with stakeholders and in this report. However, we have also been 
very mindful of the need for simplicity and ease of use. A medium to large 
supermarket will have product ranges running into the thousands and of course many 
of these products will contain multiple ingredients from multiple locations around the 
world. A simple Pizza has been shown to include 35 ingredients from 60 countries on 
5 continents. The complexity of the modern supply network is a major barrier to 
effective risk assessment but all the more reason to attempt some form of rational 
categorization of those products or to identify in advance ingredients that are most 
vulnerable to fraud. 
However, we see the most important next step as enhanced testing of the “NSF 
Fraud Protection Model” model against known incidents and to build a larger data set 
of mapped products. We are in discussion with a major international retailer to 
undertake this work. It is to be hoped that given the scale of the task the industry will 
work collaboratively within its own ranks and with regulators to develop a better 
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understanding of fraud risk and the appropriate controls and interventions to 
minimise impact and the potential for harm.  
The original model itself stood up satisfactorily to various tests and comparisons with 
known incidents and the stakeholders own perceptions of high and low risk 
categories/products although it was necessary to amend the original choice of 
horizontal axis as research indicated the likelihood of detection  was more important 
to the fraudster than ease of perpetrating the fraud.  
We are confident that we have developed a useful framework and the basis for 
further enhancement that will with support and investment eventually lead to a 
dynamic tool collecting key data in near real time that will help identify and detect 
fraud allowing timely and appropriate monitoring and intervention. 
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Glossary 
Adulterant The undesirable substance in a fraudulent food or food ingredient. 
Boston Consulting Group (BCG) Matrix This is a chart that was created by the 
Boston Consulting Group in 1970 to help corporations to analyse their business units 
and is used as an analytical tool in brand marketing, product management, strategic 
management, and portfolio analysis. Quadrants on the matrix are described as stars 
(high growth, high market share), cash cows (low growth, high market share) dogs 
(low growth, low market share) and (high growth, low market share). Further 
information is available at: 
http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_bcgmatrix.html) 
British Retail Consortium (BRC) 
Economically Motivated Adulteration (EMA) The fraudulent addition of non-
authentic substances or removal or replacement of authentic substances without the 
purchaser’s knowledge for economic gain of the seller. It is also referred to as food 
fraud, economic adulteration, intentional adulteration or food counterfeiting. 
Fraudster The perpetrator of fraud 
Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI)  
Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) 
IATA International Airline Association  
Locus The position marking the intersection of the model axes 
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MARCI (Mitigate, Assure, Redeploy and Cumulative Impact) Chart The MARCI 
chart plots risks along the two axes of impact and vulnerability, and indicates each 
risk’s speed of onset by the size of the data points. This is particularly useful when 
the primary purpose of the prioritization exercise is for risk response: risks plotting 
the farthest in the upper right quadrant represent the highest impact and vulnerability 
and would benefit the most from additional management effectiveness in managing 
the risks. 
NCFPD National Collaboratory on Food Protection and Defense 
NRLS National Reporting and Learning System Acentral database of patient 
safety incident reports 
RASFF Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed  
SEDEX Supplier Ethical Data Exchange  SEDEX provides a secure, online 
database which allows members to store, share and report on information on four 
key areas: Labour Standards, Health & Safety, The Environment & Business Ethics. 
http://www.sedexglobal.com 
SMIS Safety Management Information System UK rail industry network national 
database for the recording of safety related events. Its use is mandatory for all 
Infrastructure Managers and Railway Undertakings operating on Network Rail 
managed infrastructure. The collection of safety related data and turning it into 
intelligence and risk information assists the industry in analysing risk, predicting 
trends and focussing on major areas of safety concern. It is key to successful 
management, planning and decision making within the industry. 
STEADES Safety Trend Analysis and Data Exchange Database of aviation 
incident reports for global safety performance improvement. 
USP – US Pharmacopoeia  
 
 
